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More About The 1968 Tet Offensive
For several thousand years, Vietnamese Lunar New Year has been a
traditional celebration that brings the Vietnamese a sense of happiness,
hope and peace. However, in recent years, It also bring back a bitter
memory full of tears. It reminds them the 1968 bloodshed, a bloodiest
military campaign of the Vietnam War the North Communists launched against
the South.
The "general offensive and general uprising" of the north marked the sharp
turn of the Vietnam War. Today there have been a great number of writings
about this event. However, it seems that many key facts in the Communist
campaign are still misinterpreted or neglected.
In the mid-80, living in Saigon after being released from the Communist
"re-education camp," I read a book published in the early 1980's in America
about the story of the 1968 Tet Offensive. It said that the North
Vietnamese Army supreme command had imitated one of the greatest heroes of
Vietnam, King Quang Trung, who won the most spectacular victory over the
Chinese aggressors in the 1789 counter-attack - in planning the 1968
operations.
The book quoted King Quang Trung's tactic of surprise. He let the troops
celebrate the 1789 Tet Festival one day ahead so that he could launch the
attacks on the first three days of the lunar new year while the Chinese
troops were still feasting and not ready to organize their defense.
Those who claimed the similarity between the two campaigns certainly did
not know the whole truth, but jumped into conclusion with wild imagination
after learning that the North Vietnamese attacking units also celebrated
Tet "one day ahead" before the attacks.
In fact, the Tet Offensive broke out on the Tet's Eve - in the early
morning of January 30, 1968 at many cities of Central Vietnam, such as Da
Nang and Qui Nhon, as well as cities in the central coastal and highland
areas, that lied within the Communist 5th Military Region.. The other
cities to the south that included Saigon, were attacked 24 hours later at
the small hours of January 31. Thus the offensive lost its element of total
surprise that every tactician has to respect.
But It surprised me that some in the American media were still unaware of
such tragic story.
The story started some 5 months previously. On August 8, 1967, the North
Vietnam government approved a lunar calendar specifically compiled for the
7th time zone that covers all Vietnam, replacing the traditional lunar
calendar that had been in use in Asia for hundreds of years.
That old calendar was calculated for the 8th time zone that Beijing falls
right in the middle. It was accepted in general by a few nations such as
China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hong Kong and somewhat in Japan and Korea, mostly
for traditional celebrations and religious purposes. South Vietnam used
this calendar. With common cultural origin, these countries needed not have
their own calendar, particularly it has not been used for scientific and
administrative activities.
The North Vietnam new lunar calendar differs from the common calendar about
some dates, such as the leap months of certain year (1984 and 1987) and the
Tet's Eve of the three Lunar New Years: Mau Than (1968), Ky Dau (1969) and
At Suu (1985). South Vietnam celebrated the first day of the Mau Than lunar
year on January 30, 1968, while North Vietnam celebrated it on Jan 29, 1968.
It was obviously that the North Vietnamese leaders had ordered the
offensives to be launched on the night of the first day of Tet to take the
objectives by total surprise. By some reason, the North Vietnamese Army
Supreme Command was not aware of the fact that there were different dates
for Tet between North and South Vietnam. Therefore, most NVA units in the
Communist 5th Military Region - closer to North Vietnam - probably used
North Vietnamese calendar, and conducted their attacks in the night between
Jan 29 and 30, while their comrades farther to the south attacked in the
night from Jan 30 to 31.
Many in the intelligence branch of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were
well aware of the reason why the Communist forces launched their attacks at
two different dates. Information from sources among NVA prisoners of war
and ralliers about the new calendar of North Vietnam should have been
neglected by the American side. The information was also available in
broadcast from Hanoi Radio.
In military operations, nothing is more important than surprise. So the
Communist forces lost their advantage of surprise on more than half of the
objectives. Had the Vietnamese Communists conducted their coordinated
attacks at the same H-hour, South Vietnam would have been in much more
troubles.
The large scale offensive resulted in drastic human and morale losses of
the Communist forces. However, the offensive caused an extreme negative
effect in the American public opinion and boosted the more bitter protests
against the war.
Until lately, the Ha Noi propaganda and political indoctrination system has
always claimed the Tet offensive their military victory, and never insisted
on their victory over the morale of the American public.. Obviously, Ha Noi
leaders won a priceless victory at an unintended objective.
In South Vietnam, on the contrary, the offensive created an unexpected
attitude among the people.
After the first few hours of panic, the South Vietnamese armed forces
reacted fiercely. There were hundreds of stories of brave soldiers and
small units who fought their enemies with incredible courage..
A large number of those who were playing fence-sitters especially in the
region around Hue City then took side with the nationalist government.
Several mass graves were found where thousands unarmed soldiers, civil
servants and civilians were shot, stabbed, or with skulls mashed by clubs
and buried in strings of ropes, even buried alive. A large number of VC-
sympathizers who saw the horrible graves, undeniable evidence of the
Communist barbarian crimes, changed side.
The most significant indication of such attitude could be observed from the
figures of young volunteers. to join the army. After the first wave of
Communist attacks, a great number of youth under draft age - below 20 years
old - voluntarily enrolled in the army for combat units, so high that
thousands of young draftees were delayed reporting for boot camps.
On the Communist side, the number of ralliers known as "chieu hoi"
increased about four times. The offensive planners apparently expected the
so-called "people upraising," so most secret cells were ordered to emerge.
When the attacking units were crushed, cell members had to flee to the
green forests. Thus the Tet offensive helped South Vietnam neutralize much
of the Communist infrastructure before the Phoenix Campaign got rid of many
others.
Unfortunately, such achievements were nullified by the waves of protests in
America. As in any other developing countries, nobody takes heed of a
speech from a Vietnamese official. But the same thing from an American
statesman or even a protester could be well listened to and trusted. So
information from the Western media produced rumors that the USA was about
to sell off South Vietnam to the Communist blocks.
The rumors were almost absolutely credible to the Vietnamese - particularly
the military servicemen of all ranks - because of another hearsay that
until now have a very powerful impact on the mind of a great number of the
South Vietnamese. There have been no poll on the subject, but it was
estimated that more than half of the soldiers strongly believed that "it
was the Americans who helped the Communist attack the South Vietnamese
cities."
Hundreds of officers from all over South Vietnam asserted that they "saw"
NVA soldiers moving into the cities on US Army trucks, or American
helicopters transporting supplies to NVA units. In Saigon, most people
accepted the allegation that the Americans deliberately let the Communists
infiltrate the capital city because the American electronic sensor defense
system around Saigon was able to detect things as small as a mouse crossing
the hi-tech fences.
Another hearsay among the South Vietnamese military ran that "none of the
American military units or installation and agencies - military or civilian
- was under Communist first phase of the offensive (February) except for
the US Embassy. And only after nearly three weeks did the US Marines
engaged in the battle of Hue, in the old Royal Palace" The allegation
seemed to be true. The American combat units, however, were fighting fierce
battles in phase 2 (May 1968) and phase 3 (September 1968).
Similar rumors might have been of no importance if they were in America.But
in Vietnam, they did convince a lot of people. In the military, they dealt
deadly blows on the soldiers' morale. Their impacts still lingered on until
the last days of April 1975.
The truth in the rumors did not matter much. But the fact that a great
numbers of the fighting men strongly believed the rumors turned them into a
deadly psychological weapon which very few or maybe none has ever properly
treated in writings about the Vietnam War. Most authors studied the war at
high echelons, but neglected the morale of the buck privates and the effect
of the media in the Vietnam War. No military plan even by top strategists
in the White House could succeed if half of the privates believed that they
would be defeated before long. So why should they go on fighting?
For years, I have been wondering how much the American public was
uninformed about the Vietnam War.
From "My War" (unpublished) by L.T.
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