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The Downfall of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe


     The shocking fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe in the
late eighties was remarkable for both its rapidity and its scope.  The
specifics of communism's demise varied among nations, but similarities in
both the causes and the effects of these revolutions were quite similar. 
As well, all of the nations involved shared the common goals of
implementing democratic systems of government and moving to market
economies.  In each of these nations, the communist regimes in power were
forced to transfer that power to radically different institutions than they
were accustomed to.  Democracy had been spreading throughout the world for
the preceding two decades, but with a very important difference.  While
previous political transitions had seen similar circumstances, the actual
events in question had generally occurred individually.  In Europe, on the
other hand, the shift from communism was taking place in a different
context altogether.  The peoples involved were not looking to affect a
narrow set of policy reforms; indeed, what was at stake was a hyper-radical
shift from the long-held communist ideology to a western blueprint for
governmental and economic policy development.  The problem inherent in this
type of monumental change is that, according to Ulrich K. Preuss, "In
almost all the East and Central European countries, the collapse of
authoritarian communist rule has released national, ethnic, religious and
cultural conflicts which can not be solved by purely economic policies"
(47).  While tremendous changes are evident in both the governmental and
economic arenas in Europe, these changes cannot be assumed to always be
"mutually reinforcing" (Preuss 47).  Generally it has been theorized that
the most successful manner of addressing these many difficulties is the
drafting of a constitution.  But what is clear is the unsatisfactory
ability of a constitution to remedy the problems of nationalism and ethnic
differences.  Preuss notes that when the constitutional state gained favor
in North America, it was founded on the principle of the unitary state; it
was not designed to address the lack of national identity which is found
throughout Europe - and which is counter to the concept of the
constitutional state (48). "Measured in terms of socioeconomic
modernization," writes Helga A. Welsh, "Central and Eastern European
countries had reached a level that was considered conducive to the
emergence of pluralistic policies" (19).  It seemed that the sole reason
the downfall of communism, as it were, took so long was the veto power of
the Soviet Union. According to theories of modernization, the higher the
levels of socioeconomic achievement, the greater the pressure for open
competition and, ultimately, democracy.  As such, the nations in Eastern
and Central Europe were seen as "anomalies in socioeconomically highly-
developed countries where particularly intellectual power resources have
become widespread" (Welsh 19). Due to their longtime adherence to communist
policies, these nations faced great difficulty in making the transition to
a pluralist system as well as a market economy.  According to Preuss, these
problems were threefold: The genuine economic devastations wrought by the
communist regimes, the transformation of the social and economic classes of
the command economy into the social and economic lasses of a capitalist
economy and, finally, the creation of a constitutional structure for
political entities that lack the undisputed integrity of a nation state
(48).

     With such problems as these to contend with in re-engineering their
entire economic and political systems, the people of East Germany seemed to
be in a particularly enviable position.  Economically, they were poised to
unite with one of the richest countries, having one of the strongest
economies, in the entire world.  In the competition for foreign investment,
such an alliance gave the late German Democratic Republic a seemingly
insurmountable lead over other nations.  In regards to the political
aspects of unification, it effectively left a Germany with no national or
ethnic minorities, as well as having undisputed boundaries.  As well, there
was no need to create a constitution (although many of the pitfalls of
constitution-building would have been easily-avoided due to the advantages
Germany had), because the leaders of the GDR had joined the Federal
Republic by accession and, accordingly, allowed its Basic Law to be
extended over their territory.  For all the good that seemed to be imminent
as a result of unification, many problems also arose regarding the
political transformation that Germany was undergoing.  Among these problems
were the following: the tensions between the Basic Law's simultaneous
commitments to supranational integration and to the German nation state,
the relationship between the nation and the constitution as two different
modes of political integration and the issue of so-called "backward
justice" (Preuss 48). The Federal Republic of Germany's Basic Law has been
the longest-lived constitution in Germany's history.  Intended to be a
short-lived, temporary document, the Basic Law gained legitimacy as West
Germany continued to march towards becoming a major economic power and
effective democratic society.  There seemed to be, at first, a tension
between the Basic Law's explicit support of re-unification and its promise
to transfer sovereignty to a supranational institution that would be
created.

     The conflict between West Germany's goals of national unity and 
international integration remained the main issue in the country's politics
for many years.  As Preuss notes, "It will be extremely difficult to escape
the economic and, in the long run also political, implications of this
double-bind situation of Germany, one that remains a legacy of the postwar
order" (51). Since the unification of Germany was accomplished through
accession, it meant, strangely enough, that neither West nor East Germany
had a say in the other's decision on whether to form a unified state or
what conditions such a unification would be contingent upon, respectively. 
Put simply, the net effect of the extension of the Basic Law to all of
Germany did not guarantee the implementation of a new joint governing
policy or a new constitution for the country.   It seemed, as a result of
some esoteric articles of the Basic Law, that the GDR would cease to exist
legally and the FRG would survive.  It was impossible to draw the
conclusion that both would die out and be replaced by a new political
identity.  Many of the Federal Republic's laws immediately applied in the
GDR (Gloebner 153).  Article 146 of the Basic Law, put simply, allowed for
the annulment of the Basic Law, to be replaced with another governing
system, without previously binding the people to any specific rules. 
Seemingly, it sanctions revolution, and, "as proved to be the case in 1990,
this is not a purely theoretical conclusion" (Preuss 52).  Some suggest
that, by unifying through accession, Germany has made problems which could
end up overshadowing the benefits of unification.  The suggestion is that
the implementation of a constitution by a society without experience in
utilizing it, without the necessary institutions and without the
corresponding value system will bring about more harm than good
(politically). The imposition of the Basic Law was the root for much of the
mistrust between East and West Germans following unification.  In regards
to the East Germans, the Law was effectively self-imposed, and "neither
submission nor voluntary self-submission is likely to engender the social
and political coherence which is a necessary condition for a stable
democracy" (Preuss 54). In regards to the economic aspects of unification,
some major problems exist in the transition to democracy and market
economics.  According to Preuss, the two main issues included in the realm
of "backward justice" are the privatization of large pieces of state
property, and the punishment of the elites of the previous regimes and
their comrades under the headings of "self-purification" and "collective
amnesia."  The privatization issue is among the thorniest involved in any
country's transition from communism.  For one, a system of procedures must
be developed simply to transfer such large amounts of property to private
citizens.  Also, there must be mechanisms put in place to both protect new
owners from claims of previous owners and to satisfy former owners without
alienating possible future investors.  The problem boils down to the fact
that private property laws do not always coincide with the "fair" concept
of restitution.  As Petra Bauer-Kaase writes, "East Germans still have
difficulties in adjusting to a political system where individuals have a
great deal of responsibility for their own life" (307).  The former East
Germans look upon this issue with contempt, because it is the Westerners
who have control over the rules, as well as the enforcement of those rules.
This is merely one of a multitude of instances where this mistrust
manifests itself.

     There are also the issues of self-purification and collective amnesia.
Due to the pervasive nature of the communist regime's surveillance programs
and so forth, there is very little room for anyone to claim pure hands. 
While West Germans can claim that they are innocent by virtue of geography,
East Germans are never able to escape the suspicions that they may have
been part of the machine.  Government jobs are denied to those who were
affiliated with the Stasi, and private businesses also may deny employment
to these citizens.  While unification has occurred theoretically, in
reality the Germany today is one of de facto separate-but-equal citizenship.
 There is no denying that there have been many problems associated with the
unification of East and West Germany.  The transition from communist state
to liberal democracy is a very  difficult one, and there is no real way to
predict how the German experience will turn out.  As Preuss writes, "The
transition from an authoritarian political regime and its  concomitant
command economy to a liberal democracy and a capitalist economy is as
unprecedented as the short-term integration of two extremely different
societies - one liberal-capitalist, one authoritarian-socialist - into one
nation state" (57).  In other words, the unification of Germany is one of
the most complicated and unprecedented historical events since the
unification of Germany.

Jeremy Waldroop

Works Cited

Bauer-Kaase, Petra.  "Germany in Transition: The Challenge of Coping with
Unification."

German Unification: Processes and Outcomes.  M. Donald Hancock and Helga A.
Welsh, eds.

Boulder: Westview, 1994.  285-311. Gloebner, Gert-Joachim. "Parties and
Problems of

Governance During Unification."  German Unification: Processes and Outcomes.
 M. Donald

Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds.  Boulder: Westview, 1994.  139-61. Preuss,
Ulrich K.

"German Unification: Political and Constitutional Aspects." United Germany
and the New

Europe.  Heinz D. Kurz, ed.  Brookfield: Elgar, 1993.  47-58.

Welsh, Helga A.  "The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the GDR:
Evolution, Revolution, and Diffusion."  German

Unification: Processes and Outcomes.  M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh,
eds.  Boulder: Westview, 1994.  17-34.